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C HAP TE R I I 
The philosophy of the Marburg School: from 
the critique of scientific cognition 
to the philosophy of culture 
Sebastian Luft 
Introduction 
The Marburg School ofNeo-Kantianism is, besides the Southwest School, 
the most widely known and most influential school formation to emerge 
within the broad movement of Neo-Kanrianism in the latter third of the 
nineteenth century. ' T he school consisted of the twin stars H ermann 
Cohen (1842-1918) and Paul Narorp (1854-1924), with the younger Ernst 
Cassirer (1874- 1945) as their satellite. Perhaps more than in any other 
philosophical grouping, the term "school " used to designate this cluster 
of philosophers merits arrention. For its core members insisted that their 
project consists, essentially, of a un ified weltanschaulich outlook on life 
whose basic commjrmenrs its fo llowers must share. This was the manner in 
wh ich the school was organized by its founders and by which they granted 
entrance to novices. As a tigh tly knit philosophical com munity, it has 
become paradigmatic for other gro upings in rhe twentieth century, such as 
the Phenomenological Movement, the Vienna Circle or the Frankfurt 
School, who all tried, despite thei r own tendencies, to emulate rhis "school 
spirit." 
Yet, rhe core tenets of this school are for the most part misrepresented. 
T h is is nor surprising given the plethora of their writings and the lack of a 
real "manifesto. "2 The conrours of an overarching vision can o nly be 
gleaned through an overview of the publications stemming from the 
' To deAcet po5Sible criricism from Lhe sran, when I speak of" the ~larburg School," I mean essenrially 
Hermann Cohen, Paul Nawrp, and Ernst Cassirer, and I exclude other philosophers working ar the 
Unh•ersity of Marburg, such :u Nicolai Harrmann or Hans-Gcorg Gadamer, who wrote his 
d.issertation under Natorp. 
• Narorp's shorr Phj}qsophir (Natorp 1oo8l can serve as an inrroducrion to the main aims of rhe 
Marburg School. However. published in 1911, it comes rather late in the life of the school and at a 
rime in Natorp's life when his own paradigms had begun to shift. 
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M arburg School, and not just irs most popular writings, which lie in the 
philosophy of science. Given the predominant recep£ion of the writings in 
this area, to introduce the philosophical principles and intentions diiving 
rhe Marburg School, one has to confront a widespread misunderstanding 
head-on. In most presentations, the (Neo-)Kantianism of the Marburg 
School is treated as a narrowed form of Kanr's philosophy. Allegedly, 
it reduces Kant's rranscenden tal philosophy ro a theory of natural-
mathematical science, thereby relegating philosophy to a "handmaiden 
of the sciences." Kant's critical system becomes whittled down to an 
epistemology of natural-scientific cognition. A main concern in presenting 
this school must be a rejection of dtis erroneous reading, which is under-
standable only in light of the writings that were most widely read. 
While it is true char the theory of scientific cognition the Marbw gers 
formuJated is an important aspect of this school, it would be misleading to 
see their main intentions exhausted in a theory of science. Instead, the main 
intention of this school was from the outset a broadening of the crit ique, 
both in method as well as scope. FormuJaically, "the critique of reason 
becomes the cri tique of culture, .. as Cassi rer announces in the first volume 
of his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms in 1923 (Cassirer 1954: r: rr). Bur it is 
moscly overlooked that when Cassirer issues this "battle cry," he m erely 
repeats the semimenr that inspires the school as a whole, starting from 
Cohen and Narorp. Such a critique, however, cannot do without a look at 
the effort of the sciences that work on different aspects of cuJtural Life. As 
Narorp emphasizes, what is sought is "a truth which, armored with the 
impenetrable steel of the most genuine, most durable science, should ar the 
same time be fit to satisfy not calculating reason, burro answer co the most 
secret, innermost doubts and questions of the soul" (Natorp 2008: 22) . ~ 
T h is concept of science is the target of critidsms that claim char science is 
an alienation From life and that culture is nothing bur the indifferent field 
of inauthentic existence. 
T o sketch a grand vision of clhis school is the cask of this chapter. The 
school's scope is, in effect, so great chat it goes beyond that of Kant's 
architectonics, such that che designation "Neo-Kantian" is inadequate. lt is 
no exaggeration to say that this school presents one of the most encom-
passing phjlosophical visions to arise in the tradition of classical German 
philosophy. Having modified and updated Kant's critical philosophy, 
having taken in Hegel's philosophy and the dimension of the hisrorical, 
having wirnessed the dominance of scientific positivism in the latter half of 
' Al l quot~tions from the German original arc rranslated by rh~ author. 
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the nineteenth cenrury, and having observed other Neo-Kamian tenden-
cies attempting ro cou nter the dominance of such a positivism, the 
Marburg School, in the late Cassirer, self-co nsciously situates itself 
between Kant and H egel. It is one of the last great syn thesizing attempts 
in the Enlightenment tradi tion before the advent of posrmodernism. But, 
as contemporary thought has moved beyond such a radical stance, there are 
reasons ro believe that there will be more sympathy for this "Marburg 
vision" roday. h has che power to rival or complement other attempts char 
consider modernism an "unfinished project" rather chan a quaint dream 
that is amgetriiumt. 
As these preliminary reflections make clear, I treat rhe Marburg School 
as a unified phUosophical vision . This is not ro say that all members agreed 
on every aspect. H ence, it will be necessary to trace the steps that led, first, 
from Kant to Cohen , who laid out the first systematic position that defined 
the Marburg School. Yet, both Narorp and Cassirer were dissatisfied wich 
Cohen's position che moment it went beyond a philosophical justification 
of the exact sciences. The subtle moves on the part of Natorp away from 
Cohen are a story of their own,4 though Natorp remained in strong 
outward uniry with Cohen. This "closing of ranks" is explicable only 
through rhe intellectual and political landscape of the rime. Cassirer, 
who never lived in M arburg and was, for that reason, o ften not considered 
part of this school , was unconcerned with such political games and 
expanded Cohen's scope, while remaining within the general framework 
of the Marburg School. Thus, rhe full-blown shape of the Marburg School 
as a philosophy of cuhure can be seen in Cassi rer. 
Hence, in the first section of this chapter, l discuss the general frame-
work ofKanr's question as ro the conditio ns of the possibiliry of synthetic 
a priori cognition and how it rakes on the concrete task of philosophical 
work with respect to the existi ng factum of the sciences. The latter is the 
starring point for the Marburgers. To repeat, the most important aspect of 
their philosophical efforts is their expansion of Kant's critique of reason 
into a critique of culture. A critiq ue of scientific culrure is bur the begin-
ning. Bur, ro understand this transformation of the Kantian project into 
that of Marburg Neo-Kantianism, l discuss some key moves chat occurred 
in Cohen in order to bring about this novel project. ln the second section, I 
will trace the move from Cohen's "critical" idealism to Cassirer's 
4 S« the s~minal srudy by H . Holzhcy. Col!m tmd Nnwrp. 1 vols. (Basel and Stuttgart: Schw.t~. 1986), 
who deta ils the philosophy of Cohen and Narorp both in their collaborarion as well as in thei r 
differences (i ncluding a great amount of a rch ival material). 
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"symbolic" idealism. Here, too, f confine myself ro the main moves 
occurring in Cassirer in order co reconstruct his philosophy of the 
symbolic. ln rhe third secrion, I will unfold the full-blown philosophy of 
culture as it is laid out in Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, including 
his teleological vision for humankind. ln a conclusion , I will spell our whar 
I believe could be the legacy of the Marburg School for contemporary 
effons in philosophy and culture writ large. T his legacy has lived on , in 
peculiar ways, in "N eo-Neo-Kantians," bur it has been forgotten that ir 
Aourished in Marburg a century ago. 
From transcenden tal to critical idealism: the factum 
of the sciences 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is an exercise in theoretical philosophy 
(epistemology) and in rhis function an investigation into rhe nature, 
capacity, and limits of knowledge. Kant also dubs chis investigation a 
"tractate on method" since the task of critique involves concrete steps to 
establish the fac t that we have true cognition. "Real" rational cognition is, 
as Kanr is proud co have discovered, synthetic a priori, as our reason is 
capable of expanding our knowledge wi thour rhe aid of experience. Hence, 
the task Kant sets for himself is ro establish how this cognition comes 
abour. In the Firs t C ritique, this presentation is synthetic, in rhar Kant 
presents step by step the contributions of the two seems of knowledge, 
sensibility and understanding. The possibility of sensibili ty is explained, 
in rhe Aesthetics, through the doctrine of space and time as forms of 
intuition. The Analytic discusses the manner in which the undersrandj ng 
applies concepts (categories of pure reason) ro intuitio ns. The crucial step 
beyond an explanation of chis fact (quid focu) is the questio n as to how we 
are justified in making a priori claims abou t objects of experience (quid 
jactt) . In the Prolegomena, however, Kant opts for a different manner of 
presentation, the analytic one, starting our from the factum of existing 
cognition and inquiring into the conditions of the possibility of its coming-
about. Both manners of presentation supposedly reach the same desired 
goal; their difference is merely heuristic. 
lr is the analytic path of the critique that the Marburgers preferred. The 
reason for chis is the acknowledgment of the factum of synthetic a priori 
cognition, nor as it is established in rhe abstract, bur as it is applied in the 
mathematical exact sciences. As factum , as the result of the process of being 
made (focere) by scien tific thought, it is ro be explained as already existing. 
The working our of rhisfoctttm was carried our in what Cohen calls Kant's 
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"transcendental method," a term that would become the method of rhe 
Marburg School, though this phrase is nor found in Kane. One of Cohen's 
key interpretive claims regarding Kant's philosophy was, accordingly, char 
"the transcendental method was conceived in a meditation on Newton 's 
Philosophiae Natura/is Principia Mathematica" (Cohen 1987: 94). For 
Cohen, Kant's achievement lay no t so much in the abstract possibiJiry of 
synthetic a priori cognition; instead, th.is achievement was fueled by the 
fascination that this type of cognition was being obtained in mathematical 
natural sciences, insofar as mathematics is applied to nature, thereby 
enabling and effectively creating a priori cognition. How chis was possible 
and how ro justify this fact was, according to Cohen, Kant's main concern. 
H ence, the factum of reason in rhe abstract was concretely worked our in 
rhe factum of science (das Faktum der Wissmschaft). This insight is nor 
Kant's discovery, however, bur a restatement of the Western tradition. 
The factum of science is the key ro understanding the Western project of 
philosophy, to Cohen, and Kant merely took up this tluead that began 
with Plato, who placed philosophy on the secure foundation of science. 
This entire tradition can only be adequately appreciated when seen 
through the prism of the constant proximity of ph.ilosophy and science 
beginning with Plato's idealism, which is "the methodological generaror of 
science" (Cohen 1987: xvii ). Science, however, is an ongoing process by 
which thought, through the produccion of new ideas and hypotheses, 
conquers reality. What reality is can only be o btained under this assump-
tion, rhar we can onJy comprehend what we, as Kant defines transcen-
dental idealism, "lay inro rhings" through our reason. H ence, rhe 
connection between science and philosophy as idealism is a necessary one: 
The factum of science is rhe basic assumption rhar philosophy makes and 
wirhour which it cannot begin. Therefore, this factum is nor dogmati-
cally assumed bur is rather rhe methodological presupposition. If all 
thinking, as production of ideas. unfolds and constructs itself in hypo-
theses, then it is necessary ro understand as the first hypothesis: rhar of 
science itself. (Cohen 1987: 41) 
Thus, while scientific progress is o ngoing, what remains constant is the 
production of hypotheses, which are confirmed or fals ified. In this acdviry, 
the sciences are in effect idealistic, as they bring, in broad generali ty, real ity 
under ideas (concepts, theories). Only then can one truly speak of experi-
ence of reality. Cohen's original reading of Kant's Theory ofE-<perience (the 
ride of his first work on Kant), in his attempt to "lay a new ground for the 
Kanrian doctrine of the a priori" (Cohen 1987: ix), is d1at rhe experience 
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Kant means is me experience on the part of the scientist, when she 
conceives the numbers and laws under which nature stands. This is an 
ongoing activity of thought, nor in the generational sequence of research-
ers, bur in terms of rhe logical content of the scientific achievements 
(Cohen is a fierce enemy of a psychologistic reading of scientific progress). 
The factum is, as Narorp says, a fieri, someth ing being made, a making on 
th e part of thinking subjects with regard to the logical progress (Natorp 
2013: 39) . As fieri, this progress is never-ending. Reality as fully logically 
penetrated is the unatta inable " rhing in itself." 
Looking back ar Kant's rranscendentaJ idealism, what has thus 
happened here? Transcendental ideaJism is the claim that we undertake 
rhe Copernican experiment to view objects insofar as they conform ro our 
cognitive capacities and rhar we never experience the thing in itself bur 
aJways only insofar as it appears ro us. ln the Marburg reading, modern 
natural science is already enacting this ideaJism , unbeknownst ro itself. 
The phenomena that science ascertains are rhe laws of nature that we 
impose based on our reason. Philosophy, then , has no task of its own, it 
can have no territory of its own where it can perform itssuigeneris work. All 
it can do is reconstruct the work in t he sciences, nor attempt ro do 
something over and beyond ir. lt is, thus, a critique of the factum of the 
sciences; the c ritique is a critique of reason as it is enacted in scientific 
progress. As such, Cohen conceives transcendental idealism as critical 
ideaJism with the express purpose of critiquing thought as it becomes 
enacted in the sciences. This confirms the close tie between philosophy 
and science that is the signature of Western thought. Kant merely brought 
this insight to rhe clearest expression. 
How does philosophy do this, concre tely? What remains as the task of 
philosophy (the "uanscendenral method")? Cohen describes the latter 
thus: 
C ritique, rhus, means first and foremost the warning: not to identifY or 
place on equal footing philosophy with mathematics or natural science. 
Philosophy's task is nor to create things or - as the seductive and infamous 
saying goes, borrowed from mathematics - to 'construct' them, but instead 
merely to understand and to test how the objens and laws of mathematical 
experience are constituted. Bur the critique yields, along with chis warning, 
ar che same time the insight and the consolacion that mathematical natural 
science does not merely rest on mathematics and experience, bur itself 
partakes in philosophy. The critique reaches to see and explore chis partak-
ing, and the philosopher exploring this feels in rhe object of his critique the 
spirit of his own spirit. (Cohen 1987= 73¥".) 
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What happens now with one of the central demands of Kant, the establish-
menc of a priori cognition, if science is an ongoing process that never ends? 
Did not Kant claim to have discovered the totality of categories and the 
principles by which we apply the former co nature? Here we find what is 
perhaps the most original idea developed by the Marburg School. If science 
is an ongoing process, then the original categories char Kant discerns wiU not 
suffice for the purpose of giving expression to rational cognition. Bur the 
option of simply dropping the demand of a priori cognition cannot simply 
be accepted , since this would open the door to relativism. The solution can 
only be to reconceive che a priori. As Cohen states, "new problems will require 
new presuppositions. The necessary idea of the progress in science has as a 
necessary presupposition . .. the idea of che progress of pure cognitions" (Cohen 
1977: 396). The a priori becomes, thus, dynamic,5 insofar as new insighcs 
require new concepts that are necessary for the time being bur which can be 
modified or expanded (or perhaps rendered obsolete) as the progress ensues. 
This is the attempt co reconcile the claim to objective knowledge with the 
dynamic progress of scienrific cognition, which is rational, not merely 
empirical. As Cassirer states: 
The "facr" of science is and will of course remain in irs nature a hismrically 
developing facr. If in Kanr this insight does nor yet appear explicitly, if his 
categories can still appear as finished "core concepts of reason" in number 
and conrenr, then the modern developmenr of critical and idealistic logic 
[i.e., Cohen] has made this point perfectly clear. The formJ of judgment 
mean for it the unified and active motivations of thought, which course 
through rhe manifold of its particuJar formations and are conrinuaUy pur ro 
use in the generation and formulation of new categories. (Cassirer 1994a: 18) 
In Cassirer's rendition of this concept, one can distinguish, more precisely, 
cwo levels of a priori, a strict and a dynamic one, as he says in a letter to 
Schlick: 
I would call "a priori" in rhe stricr sense merely the idea of"unity of namre," 
that is, of the lawfulness of experience as such or perhaps. more concisely, 
the "distinctness of attribution" [Eintkutigktit der Zuordmmg] . .. But this 
principle of distinctness irselfis, to me, indeed, more than just a "conven-
tion" or an "inducrive generalization": it is, tO me, an expression of" reason," 
of Logos itself. (Cas.sirer 2009a: 5o-51, from October 2.3, 1920) 
Beyond the strict sense of 11 priori, there is a dynamically evolving web of 
concepts char are necessary for a given phenomenon and for rhe rime being, 
• On Lhis conception and its defense see M. Friedman , Tht Dynamics of R~IJJOII (Srmford: CSLI 
Publications, 2001). 
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the "very best bets" we have at a given time, with the knowledge that we 
might have better or different hers at a later stage of scientific development. 
This conception of the a priori retains the uanscendenral nature of Kane's 
philosophy (necessary conditions of possibility of cognition), while 
acknowledging that science makes progress and ever-expands its bound-
aries. The idea of sci en ti6c progress is, however, purely "logical," concern-
ing the progress of rational cognition, not a matter of em pirical discovery. 
But to the Marburgers, new empirical discoveries are only then real 
("experienced") when they are understood rationally. Everything else 
would be a fallback into a naive realism that purports tO be in touch with 
the "things themselves." 
Now if cogn ition can only be acrained in the sciences, what is left for 
philosophy to do other than co "attesr to" (beglaubigm) the latter, as Cohen 
interpretS the justificatory aspect of critique? At this point the cririque of 
philosophy as the "handmaiden of the sciences" seems to srick. Can 
philosophy do anything but "follow carryi ng the train of lady science" 
(Cassirer 2004: 358)? And if so, does this not mean that philosophy as a 
discipline of irs own has become obsolere? The Marburgers were, of course, 
well aware of this reproach. I wiU rerum to this poi or in the conclusion. For 
now, we can utiliz.e rhe proximity between philosophy and science to set 
out the broad lines of the Marburg School, returning to the project of a 
philosophy of culture. 
Critical idealism is most carefully worked out in Cohen 's theory of 
scientific cognition. But, according to the original intention, the uanscen-
dental method should be put to work in all areas of cuJrure. C ultme is 
defined as "the entire work of humanity in which the latter produces and 
forms ever higher [hinaufbildn] what is pecu liar to humanity itself' 
(Nacorp 2008: 42). The areas of culrure, such as what is made by human 
beings - focere does nor only take place in science - fo llow the Kamian 
canonical distinction into epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. The 
philosophy of culture, then, is the logic of each cultural formation, 
where the transcendental method reconstructs the logics that produce 
each cultural region. Such a particular logic can, tO Cohen, only recon-
struct the logical structure of that cultural region, not irs empirical or 
material elements. But just as in epistemology, rhe logical concepts under-
pinning ethics and law can only be derived from an existing science. The 
paradigm of starring out, in each region, from the "factum of the sciences," 
means that in ethics one must start our from legal science, jurisprudence, 
which is the point of crysraJi iz.arion of legal affairs. The grounding of 
erhics, hence, can only occur through a reconstruction of the concepts 
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and theories of an existing legal theory. Ideally, there is, as an ideal natural 
scien ce, an ideal legal science as factum chat is constantly under way, yet 
with the status of its laws and proced ures as a priori. 
Where it is plausible chat natural science works towards an ideal status, 
such a claim might strike one as less than convincing in the realm of 
jurisprudence. While Cohen might have had in mind a universal doctrine 
of universal human rights, there are undeniably very di fferent legal systems 
based on different legal traditions, which are unlikely ever to converge. Bur 
the uanscendental method becomes even less con vincing when Cohen 
declares that art history is the scientific facru m from whk h one has to derive 
the logic in the realm of aesthetics. Such a rather artifi cial approach raises 
the question whether such a search for a logical structure starring fro m a 
scientific factum can do justice to the wealth and multiplicity of culture. 
W hen rhe Marburg School, hence, is chastised for having a "scientistic" or 
"logicistic" outlook on culture, this critique is justified, the moment o ne 
goes beyond a theory of scientific cognition. It is at this point that Cassirer 
deparrs from h is reacher and moves into his own philosophy of culture, 
centered on rhe concept of the symbolic. 
From critical idealism to symbolic idealism: the ubiquity 
of the symbolic 
Cassirer accepted Cohen's c ri tical idealism with respect co the logic of 
science, but clearly regarded this approach as inadequate when it came ro 
cuJrure as a whole. This insight was itself reached, interestingly, in his early 
work in the philosophy of science, Substance and Function, of 1910. 
Cassirer's main philosophical con tribution after his historical work o n 
the development of modern science in Das Erkenntnisproblem (volumes 1 
and JJ appeared in 1906 and 1907) was his recognition chat a profound 
paradigm shift had occurred in modern science, more precisely in the 
process of concept formation. Scientists, in antiquity, believed that con-
cepts mi rrored things in the world. What underlay th is assumption, as well 
as the concomitant conception of objects, was Aristotle's substance onrol-
ogy. Accordingly, concepts were substance concepts. This Aristotelian 
manner o f co ncept formation has endured into modernity. G radually, 
however, this process was paralleled and subsequently replaced by a differ-
ent one, which conforms to the "transcendental" reading of modern 
science according to the Marburgers. Modern science has already been 
performing the Copernican turn insofar as the theories are not read off of 
the things (themselves) bur are a rational creation; they are what we lay inro 
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nature through reason. Accordingly, concepts scientists use to express 
lawful structures under which nature stands are memal creations, not 
read off of substances "out there" (recall a concept such as "atom"). 
These concepts are themselves the reflection of a different ontology. 
Such an ontology cannot be about substances existing independently of 
us. Instead, things are what they are to us to the extent that we construct 
them through our rational labor. This labor consists in the creation of 
theories and, more essentially, concepts, which do not stand as substances 
in and of themselves. Instead, concepts are relational, and the process of 
concept formation in modern science is the creation of a string (Reihe) of 
relations. Cassirer concludes his historical overview of this process: 
Thus it becomes clear chat all concept-formation [in rhe new paradigm] is 
bound to a certain Jmm of string-formation [Reihenbildung] . We call an 
imuired manifold grasped and ordered conceptually when irs members do 
nor srand alongside one another in isolation [bezielmngrlos], bur when ir comes 
forth according ro a creative basic relation from a certain beginning member in 
necessary relarion . . . according ro a principle. (Cassirer 1994b: 19f.) 
This standing-in-relation accordjng ro a principle of order is captured in the 
mathematical concept offunction,f(x). The concept in modern science is a 
"mle for the connection of rhe individual" (Cassirer 1994b: 25), whereby the 
"generality of a string-principle is the characteristic moment of the concept" 
(Cassirer 1994b: 26). Gradually, in modern science, the "logic of the 
mathematical functional principle" (Cassirer 1994b: 27) comes ro confront 
and replace rhe concept of substance. The functional concept can also be 
called a symbol: 
The basic concepts of every science, rhe means by which it poses irs 
questions and forms its solutions, no longer appear as passive representations 
of a given emiry, bur as self-created imellecrual symbols. (Cassirer 1954: 1: 5) 
To the extent that Cassirer explains the modern use of conceprs as formed 
through a functional principle, rendering them symbols, he is adding 
greater derail ro Cohen's basic doctrine. Bur Cassirer, by the time he has 
developed his philosophy of the symbolic in the 1920s, goes beyond Cohen 
and his own analysis of 1910 with the drum that this symbolism is at work 
nor only in the realm of scientific cognition, bur in all functions of 
"spiritual life." Spirirual life writ large is symbol-crearing, and the symbolic 
is ubiqwrous: 
Every genuine basic function of spirir has in common with cognition rhis 
one rrair rhar an original-formative, nor jusr imirarive, power is inherenr in 
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ir. The latter does nor just express passively what is there, bur conrains a 
spiritual energy of its own through which simple enriries of intuition receive 
a certain " meaning," a peculiar ideal conrenr. This goes for arras ir does for 
cognition, for myth as well as religion. They all Live in peculiar image-worlds 
in which nor merely somerhing empirically given mirrors irself, bur which 
rhey produce according to an independent principle. Each oF rhem creates 
irs own symbolic forms which are, nor identical co, bur in their own spiritual 
origin on a par [ebmbtlrtig] wirh inrdlecrual symbols. (Cassirer 1954: 1: 9) 
The ubiquiry of the symbolic, beyond scientific concept formation, is the 
basic ide.a of d1e philosophy of symbolic forms. Cassirer's conception of rhe 
symbol-creating spiritual energy is me antithesis of any representationalism, 
according to which (as Rorty claims) me human mind is the mirror of 
narure. ln Cassirer's use of me mirror image, me opposite holds; reality is the 
mirror of rhe human mind, whkh is nor exhausted in producing cognition 
alone. Cognition with its scientific memod is one form of spirirual energy; 
oilier spiritual energies, those ar work in mym, religion, art, have their own 
functional structures, generating their own symbolic forms. The task of 
philosophy is ro perform me "transcendental method" on dlem, not in 
Cohenian fashjon searching for each respective Factum of science, bur in 
reconsrrucring the functional principle by which each spirirual energy creares 
and shapes the functional nexus governing each form. This is a task philo-
sophy can not do without leaning on empirical research in rhese different 
areas, bur rhis is different from choosing a factum of science of mese cultural 
realms for a reconstrucrion of their "logics." The functional principle at work 
in different forms of culture cannot be reduced to a logic; "function" 
displaces Cohen 's rigid concepcion of logic. 
The term "spiri tual energy" is nor ro invoke some form of mysricism; it is 
me result of a reconstruction starting regressively from me different spheres 
of meaning mar an, myth, etc. are. They are rhe facta into whose "conditions 
of possibility" must be inquired. But mese difterent spheres of meaning are 
not simply there. T hey are created, they are the results of different types of 
imuirion, of which Kanr merely discerned rhe abstract forms of space and 
rime. Intuition is nor passively receiving bur actively forming. There is a 
plurality of experiencing me world, and each rype of viewing sees something 
differenr. Mythical space is different from me space of modern physics, as it 
is different from the space of an or religion. This is nor an empirical 
Statement abour the psychological capacities of me human species, but a 
transcendental Statement concerning me cuJrure-formjng capacities of me 
mind. Kant's Transcendental Aesthetics becomes pluralized, bur each 
account of a pardcuJar intuition remains mereby transcendental, clarifying 
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the constirucive principles governing each functional nexus. Cassirer illus-
trates this plurality of seeing with an example; 
I grasp in [a serpentine line] rhe characrer of a cerrain omamem. which is 
linked up for me with a cerrain arrisric meaning and an arristic 
significatio7r ... Once again rhe form of rhe observation can change, insofar 
as chat which at first presented irself ro me as a pure ornamenr, can reveal 
irself as the bearer of a mythical-religious meaning .... And to this form of 
seizing and internal acquisi tio n we can juxtapose, with deliberare sharpness, 
anorher one . .. While the aesthetically conremplaring and savoring indi-
vidual gives himself over to the intuition of the pure form, where ro rhe 
religiously touched person a mystical meaning is disclosed in rhis form; rhe 
form thar stands before one's eyes can also serve for thought as an example 
of a purely logical-conceprual srruccural nexus ... Where the aesthetical 
direction of viewing perhaps saw Hogarth's Line of Beaucy, the mathema-
rician's gaze sees rhe image of a certain trigonometric funcrion, e.g., che 
image of a sine curve, while the mathematical physicisr sees in rhe same 
curve rhe law of a periodic wave. (Cassirer 2009b: 97f.) 
The concrete task of rhe philosophy of the symbolic is to describe the 
"symboUc logic" in each case of symboUc formation. An individual thing is 
construed as a symbol; it makes sense only in a context of other things; 
hence rhe symbol is the "throwing rogether" (sym-batlein) of the individual 
and the general. Its meaning is contl!xtua/ and has a different meaning in 
differenr symbolic gues. This amounts to the universalization of Kant's 
transcendental idealism: the phenomenon becomes the symbo l, and to 
account for it means co reconstruct the "logic," the funcrional principle in 
each symbolic form. M yth , an, religion, science aiJ have rheir own struc-
tural principles and manners offuncrioning.6 Thus we arrive, fro m critical 
idealism, ar symbolic idealism. 
The sum coral of these symbolic forms is cuJrure; it is the tota1icy of the 
deeds on the part of humans, "for the con rent of the con cept of culture 
can nor be isolared from the basic forms and directions of spirirua1 produ-
cing: 'being' is always only robe grasped in 'doing'" (Cassirer 1954: 1: 11).7 
C ulture itself, then, is itself a functional concept that can be defined only 
th rough the deeds that bring it about, and not through a formal definjtion , 
which would render it a substantial " thing." This is why the philosophy of 
the symbolic can never be a finished "system." Rather, the systematic 
h What they have in common is what one can call the triad of the symbolic: the function of impression, 
expression, and presentation, but th~ functions work differemly in the different forms: $Ce Cusirer 
:tQ09b: 7o--j. 
" One ofCassirer's favorite authof'1 is Goo he. Recall that Faust rranslat~ "klgos· as "Tat" {deed): sec 
Faust 1. v. t2J7. 
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character of rhis philosophy must be demonstrated in rhe method of 
reconstructing the fUnctional nexuses and in distinguishing the basic 
nexuses from one another. The concrete method of this philosophy is, 
thus, phenomenological. 8 
Cassirer was not able ro complete his "system," since his Beeing from the 
Nazis forced him co change plans for publish ing the Philosophy of Symbolic 
Fonns. After he had moved from Germany to England, from there to 
Sweden and finally to the United Stares, his relocations and encounters 
with different intellectual milieus caused his interests co shift. His 
philosophical plans were far from completed when he died in 1945. This 
can be seen from the many additions and novel ideas that Cassirer produces 
after 1933. T here is no denying that Cassirer left many crirics wanting and 
many questions unanswered. Cassirer never doubted the truth of the 
projecr of a critique of culture as an analysis of rhe symbolic in irs manifold 
expressions. By way of discussing some critical questions, I turn to the 
metaphilosophicaJ significance of a critique of culture. 
T he complementaristic plurality of culture and humanity's 
self-liberation in culture 
The purpose of the philosophy of symbolic forms as a critique of culture is 
ro give a rich accounr of the plural expressions of culture while keeping 
such an account within the bou ndaries of transcendental philosophy. The 
philosophy of symbolic forms is no empirical science, though it can and 
must rely on material provided by scientific disciplines. One will never find 
Cassirer discussing a problem without reference to scholarship; e.g., lin-
guistics in the case of language, and anthropology in the case of mythical 
consciousness.9 However, the claim is a philosophical one, ro provide the 
basic fu nctional structure of each symbolic fo rm, its particular logic, which 
is the respective condi tion of the possibility of viewing, thereby creating, 
the world, "irs" world. While there can be no sysrem that wouJd claim robe 
complete - culture is an ever-evolvi ng process- the question remains, what 
is rhe overall aim of this philosophy? !fir was said that the concrete method 
is phenomenological (descriptive), one can point our that no descriptio n is 
1 Cassiru off~mimes confinns his alliam:c wi1h ph~nomenology; 5« Cassirei 2009b: 7• 9S-99. For a 
compuison ~~""~ffi Cassiru and Hu~rl s~ S. Luf1 Subj~ntlfil] and Lifro;()rld in Tra111undmwl 
PIJmommolot:~ {Evanston: Nonhwestcrn University Press. lOll), 2)5- 266. 
9 $~ C:mirer 1979: 8o. "We havt- no o1h~r way to fi nd [the rul~ governing ncb fom1) th an 10 J>k 1he 
sp« ial sciences. and we hav<' 10 accept the data wiLh which we arc provided by them." 
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naive and without presuppositions. What is, thus, the guiding clue under-
pinning Cassirer's analyses? 
T he plurality and richness of culture cannot be subjected to che bench-
mark of science. Conversely, the philosophy of culture makes it clear mar a 
merely empirical account of culture will not suffice, because such an 
account is prone ro a cultural relativism. But what is me Status of the 
symbolic forms themselves in the framework of a transcendental account? 
I c is curious that Cassirer, when it comes to the number of symbolic forms, 
rarely gives a "deduction" or a justification of why he mentions che ones he 
does and not others. Moreover, his enumerations vary and sometimes 
include other forms besides language, myrh, religion, arc, and cognition . 
And it is even more curious ro note that he devotes systematic studies only 
to language, myth, an d cognition, and in this o rder. What is the rat ionale 
for his procedure? Cassirer is nor consistent and fully clear here, and there is 
no denying these systemat ic gaps. 
Parr of this lack of fu !J exposi tion can be chalked up to Cassi rer's 
inability co finish his philosophy due to his biography. The face that he is 
not co nsistent in enumerating rhe symbolic forms - in later years, he 
mentio ns technology and economy - can be countered by reminding us 
of the functional nature of cuJ ture, that culture cannot be defined from 
above and chat it is possible rhat new forms arise in the process of cuJ rure. 
Indeed , such a discussion about the arrival of new forms of culture can 
be an interesting exercise in cultural philosophy (is, fo r instance, che 
Internet a new sym bolic form?). As he says, "human civilization neces-
sarily creates new fo rms, new symbols, new material things in which che 
life of man finds irs external expression" (Cassirer 1979: 139). Bur there is 
one importanc point where Cassirer's wavering gives rise to a mo re serious 
co ncern. 
On the one hand, Cassirer insists char he wants co give an account of the 
richness of"spiritual activity" where each spiritual power has irs sui generis 
"logic'' that cannot be compared co others, and ir would be a metabasis if 
one symbolic form were measured by the standard of another (as Cohen 
did when measuring all ocher forms with the standard of science). Thus, 
the symbolic forms are irreducible co one another. The philosophy of 
symbolic forms is an account of these symbolic forms without such an 
overreaching from one form co another. They are, in this scenario, ordered 
horizontally, displayi ng no hierarchy. Rather, they complement one 
another, rogecher yielding a richer sense of culture (Cassirer quotes 
H egel, das Ganze ist das Wahre). It is the cask of the philosophy of the 
symbolic co "spell out of phenomena d ifferent symbols and, so co speak, 
The philosophy of the Marburg School 235 
different alphabets of thought that do not contradict each orher but 
complete one another" (Cassirer 1979: 76). 
On the other han d, statements as ro the relation of the different forms ro 
one another in terms of a hierarchy are not absent. For one, Cassirer is 
unfailingly dear on one poim, the systematic locus of myth. Myth is the 
first form of spiritual and cultural development, which is primitive (though 
not irrational) and is overcome through higher forms of cultural expression. 
Religion, language, and science "conquer" myth and relegate it ro a form of 
unenlightened pre-culm ral existence. It is a stage of human development to 
which one may not return in a developed culture. T he fact that myth is 
made to re-enter the arena of culture is his critique of modern fascism 
(cf. Cassirer 1946). T his marks him as standing in the tradition of the 
Enlightenment. Conversely, Cassirer speaks of science as the highest 
expression of human spirit and as the purpose and end-goal of culture. 
While all symbolic forms "possess their own dis£inc tive type of 'universal 
validity' ... the clearest and best example of such ' u niversal validity' 
continues, in good Marburg sryle, ro be given by the language of mathe-
matical exact science. "'0 These passages make him vulnerable to the charge 
that despite the emphasis on a ll cultural forms being equal, they are, at the 
end of the day, subordinate ro scientific theory and irs logical ideal of 
universal validity in a lingua zmiversa/is, and to the critique that he remains 
aloofly disrespectful of our facticiry and our fi nitude. In this way, one may 
summarize Heidegger's position against Cassirer during the Oavos 
standoff. 
There is, as mentioned, no denying that one finds conflicting passages in 
this respect. A solutio n can only be ro spell our what Cassirer should have 
unambiguomly said in light of this conuadiction . Should scientific conduct 
be inrerpreted as the highest form of human culture? Surely a scientific 
positivism o r unal loyed belief in scientific progress is not Cassirer's senti-
ment. Despite his admi ration for modern science, and his inrimate know-
ledge thereof, Cassirer is nonetheless more aptly placed on the 
"humanistic" side of the "two culrures." Or perhaps better, Cassirer's 
position is best described as "syn thetic" in wanting ro do justice ro borh 
traditions, in that the humanistic aspect of cultu re should not be left 
unaccounrable ro reason and rational critique, and in that natural-scientific 
reason should not operate in rhe way of a cold-hearted technology. 
Thus, while the philosophy of cu lture was described as proceeding by a 
10 M. Friedman, A f'arting of rh~ Wap: Ctrrnap. Cllltiru , and H~id~gga (Chic:~go: Open Courr, 
1000) , 15 2 . 
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descriptive method, the normative aspect of critique must not be over-
looked. To subject culture ro critique, then, must not be understood in the 
way of a cold rational look at culture, and hence the excl usive search for 
logical structures, bur in the way in which Narorp describes rationali ty, as 
answering ro the deepest questions of manki nd. 
The "critique of culcure" may rh us not be seen as the call tO rationally 
"scan " rhe different cultural forms as ro their "deep" rational structures. 
Rather, what must be emphasized is that culture is the correlate of the 
common humanity that unites us; in all cultural forms we find "ultimately 
the 'sa me' human being that we always continual ly encounter in the 
development of culture, in thousands of manifestations and in thousands 
of masks."11 This insight amounts to acknowledging the emnncipatory 
power of cuhure as the self-liberation of the human being in and through 
culture. The task of rhe critique of culture is to make understandable char 
culture, in all of its forms (starting centrifugally from myth), is the gradual 
acquisition of freedom. T his critique "rejects the conception that mind 
submits ro an outward fa te. Mind must realize and actualize its own 
freedom in order ro possess it, and the whole work of culture is this very 
process of self- realization" (Cassirer t979: 89). Yet, mind is to be found, not 
in an absolute state, bur in the refractions of the various fo rms of culture, 
which a re forms of our own making and spaces where alone we can be 
human beings. Thus, the description of the symbolic forms is at the same 
dme a prescription of the common core of humanity to which we all ought 
to belong. The animal rationale is, thus, defined in a more encompassing 
sense as animal symbolicum and the ethical ideal of this vision is that 
freedom can only be obtained in culture; that culture is nor the inhibitor 
of freedom, but its condition of possibility. Cassirer ch aracterizes tbe 
"promise and hope" (1979: 90) of the distinctly Marburg-infused philoso-
phy of culture rhus: 
It hopes co come co a sorr of grammar and synrax of che human mind, co a 
survey of irs various forms and functions, and ro an insight into rhose 
general rules by which they are governed. By this we may be able co under-
stand in a better way the koinon kosmon ofhumaniry, char common world in 
which each individual consciousness participates and which it has co recon-
struct in irs own way and by irs own efforts. (Cassirer 1979: 89) 
The philosophy of culture, rhus, has no task over and above rhis realiza-
don, it is nor a symbolic form of irs own, bur it is the logic of the symbolic 
" Quoted in Friedman, A Paning oftbl' WaJ!. 154. 
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in its richness of expression. It makes us understand that there is nor and 
ought nor ro be any life outside of culture, and that culture is both our 
space and ours ro create responsibly. 
Conclusion. The legacy of Marburg: the collaboration 
of philosophy and science; the emancipatory function of culture 
Regarding the legacy of the Marburg School, let me mention one aspect in 
conclusion, where [ believe irs efforts bear resemblance to some of roday's 
philosophical concerns. 
Let me return to the critique of philosophy as rhe "handmaiden of 
the sciences." The critique consists in the claim that, with this all-
encompassing ideaJ of culture and the insistence that philosophy cannot 
do without the individuaJ sciences deaJing with the differem forms of 
culruraJ expression, philosophy is indeed relegated ro nothing other than 
the former's handmaiden. I think it is fair to say that many contemporary 
philosophers would bristle ar this notion of philosophy. fn order to 
correctly assess what philosophy is to accomplish, one can compare the 
Marburg School with another form of Neo-Kantianism, namely Robert 
Brandom's inferentialism. I cannot delve deeper into one of the most 
impressive philosophies of our day, nor do 1 claim that Brandom is the 
only contemporary phiJosopher who could serve as example here. r only 
wish to point our one contemporary parallel to the Marburg position. 
In phjlosophy's task of "making explicit" the discursive commitmems 
we undertake when we engage in the "social ·pracrices of giving and asking 
for reasons" (Brandom 2001: 92), Brandom rejects the role of philosophy as 
being the "queen of the sciences" ("philosophy is at most a queen of the 
sciences, nor the queen" (93)). Indeed, philosophy plays no "foundational 
role with respect ro other disciplines" (ibid.) and in this sense, Brandom 
expressly embraces the image of rhe "handmaiden" (ibid.), and he describes 
the task of philosophy as follows: 
For what we do char has been misundersrood as having foundational or 
methodological significance is to provide and apply tools for unpacking the 
substantive commirmenrs char are implicit in the concepts deployed 
throughout rhe culture, including the specialired disciplines of the high 
culcure. Making those norms and inferences explicit in rhe form of claims 
exposes them for the first rime ro reasoned assessmenr, challenge, and 
defense, and so to the sort of rational emendation that is the primary process 
of conceprual evolution. But once rhe implicit presuppositions and 
consequences have been brought out inro the daylight of explicitness, the 
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process of assessment, emendation, and evolution is the business of chose 
whose concepts they are, and nor somethi ng philosophers have any author-
icy over or expertise regarding. (Brandom 1.001: 92-93) 
This definition of rhe rask of philosophy has interesting similarities wirh 
that of the Marburg School. The Marburgers would agree that ph ilosophy 
can not, and should not, provide an ultimate fow1darion , ir cannot be 
"first" philosophy, since it canno t make itself independent of the sciences 
which cUscover the concepts and functions of the regions they are sciences 
of. As Cohen says, philosophy is no Gnmdlngenwisumchnfi, a science of 
foundations. Bur as handmaiden, it also develops the tools fo r "ratio nal 
emenda tion," which precisely is c ritique, bur necessarily critique ofsome-
rhing rhar functions implicitly th rough norms, and this is culture. Directly 
addressing the issue of whether philosophy is the torch- or train-bearer of 
the sciences, Cassirer maintains that the re can be a third alternative. 
Philosophy's task can nor consist in 
mediating the inner battles rhar always again arise in science and co silence 
them through hasty solutions. Rarher, it stands in the midst of rhese bardes, 
it cannor and wishes nor to be anything bm rhe fellow combatant 
[Mimr~ilt'rin) in these. I nsread of overcoming rhe opposirions rhrough rhe 
command of thought or arrempcing to reconcile them through a mere 
comprom ise, it must rarher make rhese visible in rheir full seriousness and 
graviry. (Cassirer 2004: 358) 
As combatant in these banles, philosophy equally has the cask of making 
explicit rhe functional principles guiding rhe symbolic fo rms, which is nor 
somethi ng individual sciences can do on rheir own, bur which is nor some-
thing entirely above and beyond rhem e ither. Philosophy merely has the task 
of making explicit whar goes on implicitly in the culrural activities. What is 
made explicit in the essentially self-reflective intellectual acriviry philosophy 
is rhe fact that culture is the expression of rhe common humani ry char we 
share. Surely, the philosophy of symbolic forms "makes [hings explicir" in its 
own manner, as explained in chis essay, bur in this division-of-labor concept 
of philosophy, "Marburg" bears striking s im ilarity to "Pittsburgh ." But 
understood in the right way, this is noc a reproach chat should pur philoso-
phers working in chis mode on the defensive. Instead, it is rhe healthy 
balance any philosophy must mike when it acknowledges that it cannot 
o perate in a vacuum bur in a culture rich wirh creative work, pan of which is 
carried out in the sciences, while nor ceding irs position to na turalism. 
The moraL demand is that this process of culrure becomes ever-
expanded, keeping barbarism at bay, while knowing char the human 
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being is a "crooked piece of t imber" that can never be made straigh t. 
Emancipation fro m "self-incurred rutelage" can only come through 
partaking in culrure, which is nor anybody's private achievement, bur the 
product of "spirit." Thus, rhe Marburg School situates icself, in Cassirer, 
consciously berween Kant and Hegel. 
